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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. William Gray, Jr. *
Katherine E. Ramsey **
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Virginia has handed down seven recent
decisions addressing the authority of an agent to change the prin-
cipal's estate plan, legal malpractice claims in estate planning,
rights of incapacitated adults, limits of the constructive trust doc-
trine, effects of a reversionary clause in a deed, ownership of an
engagement ring, and proof of undue influence. The 2017 Virginia
General Assembly clarified rules on legal malpractice and tenan-
cies by the entireties, adopted the Uniform Trust Decanting Act
and the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, and ex-
panded provisions governing estate administration, life insurance,
and advance medical directives. Other legislation affecting wills,
trusts, and estates included clarifications and technical corrections
relating to augmented estate claims, non-exoneration of encum-
bered property, administration procedures, life insurance, adult fi-
nancial exploitation, death certificate amendments, and spousal
exemptions from real estate tax.1
* Partner, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1977, University of Vir-
ginia; B.S.I.E., B.A., 1973, Rutgers University.
** Partner, Virginia Estate & Trust Law PLC, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1998, Uni-
versity of Virginia; M.S., 1988, Boston University; B.A., 1986, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University.
1. Except where specifically noted, all 2017 legislation summarized in this article be-
came effective July 1, 2017.
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I. LEGISLATION
A. Correction to Revised Augmented Estate Statute
Virginia's new augmented estate statute became effective for all
decedents dying on or after January 1, 2017.2 Given the new law's
broad scope, it was perhaps to be expected that a few technical cor-
rections would be necessary once practitioners began to study the
rules. One such error was discovered in the interplay between the
augmented estate statute and the homestead allowance statute.
Under the pre-2017 version of Virginia's system, a surviving
spouse who elected to claim an augmented estate share was ex-
pressly prohibited from also claiming a homestead allowance. 3 The
General Assembly failed to remove that prohibition from the fam-
ily allowance statute in 2016 when it revised the augmented estate
system to authorize the surviving spouse to claim exempt property
and allowances in addition to an elective share.4
The 2017 General Assembly resolved the statutory conflict by
amending Virginia Code section 64.2-311(D) to confirm that a sur-
viving spouse may claim both an elective share of the augmented
estate and a homestead allowance.5 An emergency clause made
this amendment effective for the estates of decedents dying on or
after January 1, 2017, the date the augmented estate revisions
took effect. 6
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-308.1 to -308.17 (Repl. Vol. 2017). For a full discussion of the
changes to Virginia's augmented estate rules, see J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ram-
sey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 51'U. RICH. L. REV. 125,
125-30 (2016).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-311(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
4. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-311(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016) (prohibiting the home-
stead allowance claim), with Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 269, 2016 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017)); Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 187, 2016 Va. Acts
-, (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017)) (entitling the electing
spouse to homestead and other allowances).
5. Act of Feb 20, 2017, ch. 82, 2017 Va. Acts _, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-311(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017)); Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 32, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (cod-
ified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-311(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
6. Ch. 82, 2017 Va. Acts _, _; ch. 32, 2017 Va. Acts _, _.
[Vol. 52:115116
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
B. Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning
A 2016 decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia7 overturned
what many Virginia estate planners believed to have been the law
limiting a beneficiary's right to sue an estate planning attorney for
malpractice after the client's death.8 The court held that the in-
tended beneficiary under a will may sue as a third-party benefi-
ciary of the oral contract between the client and the drafting attor-
ney and, perhaps of greater concern, that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run until the client's death.9
In response, the General Assembly replaced the statute govern-
ing legal malpractice involving irrevocable trusts with a broader
statute that attempts to restore the law governing legal malprac-
tice to its prior state in all estate planning matters.10
Under the new statute, an action for damages resulting from le-
gal malpractice in estate planning accrues at completion of the rep-
resentation during which the malpractice occurred.11 The damages
may arise from legal advice or document preparation and may in-
clude future tax liability. 12 Unless a written agreement between
the client and the lawyer expressly grants standing to a third-party
beneficiary by specific reference to the statute, only the client or
the client's personal representative may maintain the action.13 As
under prior law, the cause of action survives the client's death dur-
ing the limitations period.14
Like other types of legal malpractice claims, the action must be
brought within five years after it accrues if the contract for service
as in writing, or within three years if the contract was unwritten. 15
7. See Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 292 Va.
257, 786 S.E.2d 453 (2016).
8. For a discussion of the Thorsen case, see infra Part I.B.
9. Thorsen, 292 Va. at 267, 276, 278, 786 S.E.2d at 459, 465.
10. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 93, 2017 Va. Acts -, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2,
520.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017)); Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 43, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-520.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-520.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 64.2-520.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
14. Id. § 64.2-520.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
15. Id. § 64.2-520.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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The action may not be based on damages that may reasonably be
avoided or that result from a subsequent change of law.16
To alleviate due process concerns, the new legislation does not
affect any judicial proceeding brought before July 1, 2017; any
cause of action that accrued before that date may be brought under
prior law on or before July 1, 2018, or, if later, the expiration of the
prior limitations period.17
C. Severance of Tenancy by the Entireties
In another legislative response to a court decision, the General
Assembly addressed the requirements for terminating a tenancy
by the entireties. In 2015, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in
Evans v. Evans that a deed executed only by a husband and pur-
porting to convey to his wife his interest in property, which they
held as tenants by the entireties, created a fee simple estate in the
wife.18 This decision raised questions about the creditor protection
afforded to such property.19 On the recommendation of the Boyd-
Graves Conference, the legislature enacted Virginia Code section
55-20.2 to provide that a written instrument will sever a tenancy by
the entireties only if it is a deed that both spouses sign as grantors of
the property. 20
D. Trust Decanting
"Decanting" describes the process by which the trustee of an oth-
erwise irrevocable trust distributes the trust assets to a second
trust that may have similar, but not identical, terms.21 Trust de-
16. Id. § 64.2-520.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
17. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 93, 2017 Va. Acts_, -, cl. 2, 3 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-520.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017)); Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 43, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-520.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
18. 290 Va. 176, 179, 772 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2015). For a discussion of the case, see Gray
& Ramsey, supra note 2, at 139-41.
19. Evans, 290 Va. at 187-90, 772 S.E.2d at 582-84. A concurrence would have held the
deed invalid, but would have vested title in the wife based on the parties' subsequent ac-
tions. Id. at 188, 772 S.E.2d at 583 (Powell, J., concurring).
20. Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 38, 2017 Va. Acts __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
20.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
21. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Trust Decanting, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://www.uni
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canting is a powerful tool available to trustees who believe the orig-
inal trust terms are no longer appropriate due to a change in cir-
cumstances. 22 However, there must be safeguards to prevent abuse
and unintended adverse tax consequences. 23
In 2012, Virginia became one of the first states with its own de-
canting statute.24 Virginia Code section 64.2-778.1 generally al-
lowed the trustee of any irrevocable trust administered under Vir-
ginia law to exercise a discretionary power to make distributions
to, or for the benefit of, a current trust beneficiary by appointing
all or part of the principal or income of the original trust in favor
of a trustee of a second trust. 2 5
Three years later, the Uniform Law Commission published the
Uniform Trust Decanting Act ("UTDA").26 The UTDA expanded
and clarified certain aspects of decanting that Virginia law had not
addressed. Given these improvements, and in the interest of main-
taining uniformity among the states, Virginia repealed Virginia
Code section 64.2-778.1 in 2017 and adopted the UTDA in its place
with only a few modifications. 2 7
Found in article 8.1 of Title 64.2 of the Virginia Code, the Vir-
ginia UTDA applies to any express non-charitable trust that is ir-
revocable or that is revocable only with the consent of the trustee
or a person holding an adverse interest.28 The Virginia UTDA ap-
plies regardless of when the trust was created, provided the trust
is either governed by Virginia law or has its principal place of ad-
ministration in Virginia.29 The Act does not apply to a trust that (i)
formlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title-Trust%2ODecanting (last visited Sept. 27,
2017).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 355 (2012).
25. See id.
26. For the full text of the Uniform Trust Decanting Act, see UNIF. TR. DECANTING ACT
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) [hereinafter UNIF. TR. DECANTING ACT 2015], http://www.unif
ormlaws.org/shared/docs/trustdecanting/UTDAFinal%20Act_2016novl4.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2017).
27. Compare Act of Mar. 16, 2017, ch. 592, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-779.1 to -779.25 (Repl. Vol. 2017)), with UNIF. TR. DECANTING ACT 2015, supra
note 26.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-779.1(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
29. Id. §§ 64.2-779.1(A), -779.3 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
2017] 119
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
is held solely for charitable purposes,30 or (ii) expressly prohib-
its the trustee from exercising any state law power to modify the
trust or distribute assets to a second trust.31
Any fiduciary (other than a settlor) that has discretion to distrib-
ute trust income or principal to a beneficiary also has discretion to
appoint (i.e., "decant") the income or principal to a second trust
without the consent of any person and without court approval. 32
The trustee must act in accordance with its general fiduciary du-
ties, but it has no duty to exercise the decanting power or to inform
beneficiaries of its availability.33
If the trustee may make distributions from the first trust only
according to an ascertainable or reasonably definite standard, each
beneficiary of the first trust must receive a substantially similar
interest in the second trust.3 4 The beneficial interests in the second
trust need not be identical to those in the first, though. For exam-
ple, a beneficiary's right to receive a distribution may be postponed
as long as no one else can benefit from the otherwise distributable
property during the beneficiary's lifetime and the deferred distri-
bution is payable to the beneficiary's estate (or subject to a general
testamentary power of appointment in favor of the beneficiary's es-
tate) if the beneficiary dies before the second trust is terminated. 35
As another example, a power in the first trust to distribute income
30. Id. § 64.2-779.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
31. Id. §§ 64.2-779.1(C), -779.12 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
32. Id. §§ 64.2-701 (definition of "authorized fiduciary"), -779.5(B), -779.8(B), -779.9(B)
(Repl. Vol. 2017). This is a significant change from the earlier Virginia statute, which pro-
hibited decanting by an "interested trustee." See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1(D) (Cum. Supp.
2016), repealed by Act of Mar. 16, 2017, ch. 592, 2017 Va. Acts __. An interested trustee
was (i) an individual who was "a current beneficiary of the original trust" or a permissible
distributee of income or principal if the original trust were terminated, (ii) any trustee whom
a current beneficiary could remove and replace with a trustee related or subordinate to the
current beneficiary, or (iii) an individual "whose legal obligation to support a beneficiary
[could] be satisfied by distributions" from the original trust. See id. § 64.2-778.1(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2016), repealed by ch. 592, 2017 Va. Acts - (defining "interested trustee" and "inter-
ested distributee").
33. Id. § 64.2-779.2 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
34. See id. § 64.2-779.9(A), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2017). If the first trust is decanted into mul-
tiple second trusts, the beneficiaries' interests are compared in the aggregate across all
trusts. Id. § 64.2-779.9(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
35. Id. § 64.2-779.9(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017). This is a notable difference between the Vir-
ginia statute and the UTDA, which does not allow a trustee with such limited distributive
discretion to postpone a beneficiary's right to receive or withdraw trust assets. See UNIF.
TR. DECANTING AcT 2015, supra note 26.
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or principal directly to a beneficiary may be converted into a power
in the second trust to make distributions for the benefit of the ben-
eficiary. 36 However, a change that makes the distribution standard
more or less expansive is not "substantially similar."37
If distributions under the first trust are not limited by an ascer-
tainable or reasonably definite standard, the trustee has signifi-
cantly more power to alter the beneficiaries' interests through de-
canting.38 The only applicable restrictions are that the second trust
may not (i) reduce a vested interest,39 (ii) include as a current ben-
eficiary anyone who was not a current beneficiary of the first trust,
or (iii) include as a beneficiary anyone who was not a qualified ben-
eficiary or successor beneficiary of the first trust.4 0 The trustee may
eliminate or modify the interest of any non-vested beneficiary and
any power of appointment that is not a presently exercisable gen-
eral power.41 The trustee may also effectively add potential benefi-
ciaries by creating or modifying a power of appointment to include
permissible appointees who are not beneficiaries or permissible ap-
pointees of the first trust.4 2
Special rules apply for decanting to a second trust for the benefit
of someone with a disability.43 Other restrictions protect charitable
interests, as well as preserve certain tax benefits for which the first
trust was intended to qualify. 44 Limits on decanting powers protect
the beneficiaries from overreaching by the trustee. 45 For example,
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-779.9(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
37. See UNIF. TR. DECANTING ACT 2015, supra note 26, § 12 cmt.
38. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-779.8 (Repl. Vol. 2017). See also UNIF. TR. DECANTING Act
2015, supra note 26, § 12 cmt.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-779.8(C)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2017). An interest is vested if it is not
subject to the exercise of discretion or the occurrence of a specified event that is not certain
to occur. Included are (i) a current right to a mandatory distribution; (ii) a current right at
least annually to receive income, a specified sum (such as an annuity), or a percentage of
trust property value (such as a unitrust payment) or to withdraw such amounts; (iii) a pres-
ently exercisable general power of appointment; and (iv) a right to receive an ascertainable
part of the trust property on termination. See id. § 64.2-779.8(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017); UNIF. TR.
DECANTING ACT 2015, supra note 26, § 11 cmt.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-779.8(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
41. Id. § 64.2-779.8(B), (D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
42. See id. § 64.2-779.8(D), (E) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
43. See id. § 64.2-779.10 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
44. See id. §§ 64.2-779.11, -779.16 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
45. See id. §§ 64.2-779.13, -779.14 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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a trustee may not decant to a second trust that increases the trus-
tee's compensation unless the change is approved by all of the qual-
ified beneficiaries or by the court.46 Similarly, a trustee may not
add language in the second trust that provides greater relief from
liability for the trustee's breach of trust, although the second trust
may divide and reallocate fiduciary powers among multiple fiduci-
aries and relieve any of them from liability for the acts and omis-
sions of another.47 Lastly, decanting may not be used to limit a
power to remove or replace the trustee unless approved by the per-
son who holds the power. 48 If the change involves a power held by
someone who has not consented, it must be approved by the quali-
fied beneficiaries or by the court and the power must be given to
another person.49
The trustee must give written or electronic notice of its intent to
exercise the decanting power to each settlor of the trust, qualified
beneficiary, holder of a presently exercisable power to appoint
trust property, person authorized to remove or replace the trustee,
co-trustee, trust advisor or protector, person with an adverse inter-
est who has the power to consent to revocation of the trust, and
fiduciary of the first or second trust.50 If the trust includes a char-
itable interest, the trustee must also notify the Attorney General. 51
The notice must include copies of the first trust instrument and
each proposed second trust instrument, and it must specify how
the trustee intends to exercise the power and the proposed effective
date for the exercise.5 2 The notice must be provided sixty days be-
fore the intended effective date unless all persons entitled to re-
ceive notice sign a waiver of the waiting period. 53
The trustee must exercise the decanting power in a signed record
or writing that identifies both the first and second trusts and spec-
ifies which property will be held subject to their respective terms. 54
46. See id. § 64.2-779.13(A), (B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
47. See id. § 64.2-779.14(A), (D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
48. See id. § 64.2-779.15 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
49. See id.
50. Id. §§ 64.2-701 (definition of "record"), -779.5(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
51. Id. § 64.2-779.5(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
52. Id. § 64.2-779.5(E) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
53. Id. § 64.2-779.5(A), (F) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
54. Id. § 64.2-779.7 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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The trustee, a person entitled to notice, or another trust benefi-
ciary may petition the court to (i) instruct the trustee as to the pro-
posed decanting, (ii) appoint a special fiduciary to determine
whether the decanting is appropriate, (iii) approve an exercise of
the decanting power or determine that it was ineffective, (iv) pro-
vide instruction about other decantings, or (v) order other appro-
priate relief.55 The trustee may also ask the court to approve a com-
pensation increase or modify a provision for the trustee's
removal.56
E. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets
The 2017 General Assembly replaced the little-used Privacy Ex-
pectation Afterlife and Choices Act, which was enacted with strong
support from the digital industry in 2015, with the Uniform Fidu-
ciary Access to Digital Assets Act ("UFADA").5 7 UFADA is based
on the 2015 revisions to a uniform act published by the Uniform
Law Commission.55 The statute expands the rules governing access
to records of a digital account or the actual contents of the account
by a fiduciary of the account user. 59 UFADA's approach represents
a compromise between protecting the privacy of digital asset own-
ers and enabling personal representatives to access the infor-
mation they need in order to carry out their duties efficiently. 60
UFADA applies to the personal digital assets and accounts of
any Virginia resident, and authorizes access by a fiduciary acting
55. Id. § 64.2-779.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
56. Id. § 64.2-779.6(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
57. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 80, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-116 to -132 (Repl. Vol. 2017)); Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 33, 2017 Va. Acts _, -
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-116 to -132 (Repl. Vol. 2017)). For a discus-
sion of the prior statute, see J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 201-06 (2015).
58. See REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (2015) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2015) [hereinafter REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS 2015], http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/Fiduciary%2OAccess%20to%2ODigital%20Assets/2015_RUFADAAFinal%20
Act_ 2016mar8.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
59. Cf. id. at 1-2.
60. For the full text of the uniform law as revised in 2015, see REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY
ACCESS 2015, supra note 58.
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under the resident's will or power of attorney; a personal repre-
sentative of a deceased resident; or a conservator, guardian, or
trustee for the resident.61
The account owner (or "user") may direct the person holding the
digital assets in the account (or "custodian") whether and to whom
to disclose some or all of the user's digital assets by any of the fol-
lowing means, listed in order of priority: 62 (i) an online tool (sepa-
rate from the account terms-of-service agreement) that allows the
user to modify or delete a direction at any time; 63 (ii) the user's win,
trust, power of attorney, or other written or electronic record;64 or
(iii) the terms-of-service agreement for the account.65
To the extent the custodian is directed to disclose digital assets,
it may choose to do so either by (i) granting to the person author-
ized by the user to administer the asset (the "designated recipient"
selected by the user or, if none, the fiduciary) full access or partial
access that is sufficient to perform the tasks with which the person
is charged; or (ii) providing written or electronic copies of any dig-
ital asset that the user could have accessed.66 The custodian does
not need to disclose any digital asset that the user deleted and it
may assess a reasonable administrative charge to cover the costs
associated with the disclosure.67 If the disclosure relates to some
but not all of the digital assets and segregating the assets would
impose an undue burden on the custodian, the custodian may seek
relief from the court.68
In the case of a deceased user's electronic communications for
which disclosure has been authorized, the custodian may require a
written request, a certified copy of the death certificate, a certified
copy of the qualification letter, a small estate affidavit or court or-
der confirming that the disclosure is proper, a copy of the document
by which the user authorized disclosure (if not by way of an online
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-117 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
62. Id. §§ 64.2-116 (definitions of "user" and "custodian"), -118 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
63. Id. §§ 64.2-116 (definition of "online tool"), -118(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
64. Id. § 64.2-118(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
65. Id. § 64.2-118(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
66. Id. §§ 64.2-116, -120(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
67. Id. § 64.2-120(B), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
68. Id. § 64.2-120(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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tool), and certain identifying information that links the account to
the deceased user.69
If the deceased user did not authorize disclosure of his or her
electronic communications, the personal representative may still
obtain a catalog of the electronic communications sent or received
by the user and the user's other digital assets unless the user or a
court has prohibited the disclosure. 70 The custodian may require
information similar to that required for the disclosure of a deceased
user's electronic communications, including a showing that the dis-
closure is reasonably necessary for the administration of the es-
tate.71
Similar to the rules for a deceased user, in the case of a user who
has expressly granted authority to an agent under a power of at-
torney over the content of the user's electronic communications (or,
in the case of other digital assets, has not prohibited their disclo-
sure), the custodian may require the agent to make a written re-
quest and provide specific evidence of the requester's authority be-
fore making the disclosure. 72 The same rules generally apply to
trustees holding a digital account created by another user and to
conservators and guardians, except that the user's electronic com-
munications may be disclosed unless expressly prohibited. 73
Not later than sixty days after receiving the required documen-
tation, the custodian must disclose digital assets or terminate an
account as requested unless the custodian is aware of any lawful
access to the account after it received the fiduciary's request for
disclosure or termination. 74 In all events, however, the custodian
may obtain, or require a requester to obtain, a court order estab-
lishing the ownership of the account andlor the sufficiency of the
69. Id. § 64.2-121 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
70. Id. § 64.2-122 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
71. See id. §§ 64.2-121, -122 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
72. See id. §§ 64.2-123, -124 (Repl. Vol. 2017); see also id. § 64.2-1622(A)(8), (C) (Repl.
Vol. 2017) (stating an agent's general authority under a power of attorney includes authority
over the principal's digital assets other than the content of electronic communications,
which must be expressly granted).
73. See id. §§ 64.2-125 to -128 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
74. Id. § 64.2-130 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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user's consent to the requested disclosure, along with other find-
ings required by applicable law. 75 A custodian and its agents are
immune from liability for good-faith acts or omissions in compli-
ance with UFADA. 76
In addition to addressing when a third-party custodian must dis-
close a user's digital assets, UFADA details the extent of the fidu-
ciary's legal duties and authority.77 Specifically, a fiduciary has the
same authority as the user except where the user has explicitly
opted out.78 The fiduciary must manage the user's digital assets in
accordance with the same standards that apply to the management
of another's tangible property, including the duties of care, loyalty,
and confidentiality. 7 9 The fiduciary is also subject to the same
terms of service and other laws applicable to the user, and may not
use its authority to impersonate the user.80 UFADA confirms that
a fiduciary acting within the scope of its duties is considered an
authorized user for purposes of any law prohibiting unauthorized
computer access.81 This means that a fiduciary who has rightfully
obtained the user's password may access the user's account with-
out violating any laws against unauthorized access. 82 If the fiduci-
ary has authority over the user's property, it may freely access any
digital asset that is not held by a custodian or subject to a terms-
of-service agreement, such as digital art or recordings. 83 If that au-
thority extends to the user's tangible property, the fiduciary may
access any digital asset stored in the user's tangible personal prop-
erty, such as files stored on a computer, smartphone, flash drive,
or digital camera. 84
75. Id. § 64.2-130(E) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
76. Id. § 64.2-130(F) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
77. See id. § 64.2-129 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
78. See REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS 2015, supra note 58, § 15 cmt.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-129(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
80. Id. § 64.2-129(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
81. Id. § 64.2-129(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
82. See REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS 2015, supra note 58, § 15 cmt.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-129(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
84. Id. § 64.2-129(E) (Repl. Vol. 2017); see also REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS 2015, su-
pra note 58, § 15 cmt.
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F. Non-Exoneration
Ten years ago, the General Assembly enacted Virginia Code sec-
tion 64.1-157.1, which changed the default rule for the treatment
of debts secured by property that is subject to a specific bequest or
devise.85 Prior to the change, a beneficiary received a specific be-
quest or devise free of any debt, but many felt this was contrary to
what most testators intended.86 The revised statute reversed the
presumption so that such property passes subject to the debt, with-
out exoneration, unless a contrary intent is clearly set out in the
will.8 7 This approach created a problem for the personal repre-
sentative, who is responsible for paying the decedent's debts. If the
estate is closed and the specific beneficiary later fails to refinance
or pay the debt in full, the personal representative could be held
personally liable to the creditor.88
To address this issue, section 64.2-531 (formerly section 64.1-
157.1) was amended to authorize the personal representative ei-
ther to secure the release of estate property from a lien or to pro-
ceed to sell the property in satisfaction of the debt.89 To take ad-
vantage of this process, the personal representative must send a
copy of the statute by certified mail to the creditor along with no-
tice that there is no statutory right of exoneration for the debt.90
The creditor may file a claim with the commissioner of accounts
within one year after the representative qualified or six months
after the representative gives the written notice.91 If no timely
creditor claim is filed, the liability of the personal representative
or surety will not exceed the estate assets that remain in the rep-
resentative's possession and are available to apply to the debt
85. See J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates,
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 435, 447 (2008).
86. Id.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-531(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
88. Cf. id. § 64.2-555 (Repl. Vol. 2017) (declaring that a personal representative is not
personally liable for the decedent's debts if he or she "pays any legacy made in the will or
distributes any of the estate of the decedent and a proper refunding bond ... is filed and
recorded").
89. Act of Feb. 21, 2017, ch. 139, 2017 Va. Acts_, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-
531(B), (E) (Repl. Vol. 2017)); Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 34, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-531(B), (E) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-531(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
91. Id.
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when the creditor demands payment from the personal representa-
tive.92 If the creditor files a timely claim, the personal representa-
tive has ninety days in which to give the beneficiary receiving the
property written notice that the beneficiary must obtain a release
of the claim from the creditor. 93 If the estate has not been released
by the later of 180 days from the date of the notice to the benefi-
ciary or one year from qualification, the personal representative
may sell the property, apply the sale proceeds toward the claim,
and distribute any excess proceeds to the beneficiary. 94 Any defi-
ciency remains a debt of the estate.95
G. Debt Payment Priority
Virginia Code section 64.2-528, which sets forth the order in
which an insolvent decedent's debts are to be paid, has been
amended by adding unpaid child support obligations in eighth
place, after amounts held by the decedent as a fiduciary for others
and before debts and taxes due to localities and municipal corpora-
tions.96
H. Life Insurance in Divorce
New Virginia Code section 20-107.1:1 authorizes the court to ad-
dress life insurance in a divorce decree.97 Specifically, in connection
with a spousal support or separate maintenance order, the court
may order a party to (i) maintain a policy on the party's life that
was purchased during the marriage, issued through the insured's
employment, or within the insured's effective control; (ii) designate
the other party as beneficiary of some or all of the policy death ben-
efit while the insured is obligated to pay spousal support to the
other party; (iii) allocate the premium cost between the parties;
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Act of Mar. 16, 2017, ch. 591, 2017 Va. Acts , (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-
528(8) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
97. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, ch. 797, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.1:1 (Supp. 2017)).
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and/or (iv) assure the other party that that party is the named ben-
eficiary and that the policy is in good standing.98 The statute di-
rects the court to consider all factors necessary to arrive at a fair
order, including, but not limited to, the parties' age and health,
their ability to pay premiums, the cost of the policy, prevailing in-
surance rates, and the term and amount of the spousal obligation.99
I. Life Insurance Information
Two new Virginia Code sections authorize a funeral service pro-
vider to request, and an insurance company to provide, information
about a decedent's life insurance policy.100 The provider must sub-
mit the following to the insurer believed to have issued the policy:
(i) a copy of the decedent's death certificate; (ii) evidence of the de-
cedent's affiliation with a covered group if the inquiry relates to a
group life policy; and (iii) written authorization for the request
signed by the person designated to arrange for disposition of the
decedent's remains, the agent named in the decedent's advance di-
rective, the decedent's court-appointed guardian, or the next of
kin.101
Upon receiving the request, the insurance company is author-
ized, but not required, to provide information about the existence
of any life insurance policy that it or its affiliate issued on the de-
cedent's life, as well as the names and contact information, if avail-
able, of any beneficiaries on record. 102 The insurer does not have to
provide information that is confidential or protected from disclo-
sure by law.103
If the policy is payable to someone other than the decedent's es-
tate, the funeral service provider must make all reasonable efforts
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1:1(A) (Supp. 2017).
99. Id. § 20-107.1:1(B) (Supp. 2017).
100. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 482, 2017 Va. Acts-_, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
3117.01 (Cum. Supp. 2017); id. § 54.1-2818.5 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2818.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
102. Id. § 38.2-3117.01 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
103. Id.
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to pass the information along to all beneficiaries within four calen-
dar days of receiving it.104 Before providing the information, the
provider must inform the beneficiaries that they have no legal duty
or obligation to pay the decedent's debts or obligations or the cost
of funeral services.105
J. Commissioner's Fee for Statement in Lieu
An amendment to Virginia Code section 64.2-1314 eliminates
the commissioners' of accounts authorization to charge a seventy-
five-dollar fee for reviewing and approving a personal representa-
tive's statement in lieu of settlement of accounts, or its notice of
intent to file such a statement.106
K. Clerk's Fee for Paper Filing
A clerk of a circuit court that maintains an electronic filing sys-
tem may now charge five dollars to record every land record filed
by paper. 107 Previously, the fee applied to each instrument rec-
orded electronically, but that fee has now been eliminated.108
104. Id. § 54.1-2818.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
105. Id. Despite this statutory prohibition, the authors have learned that at least a few
funeral service providers are insisting that families assign the benefits to the provider be-
fore the funeral.
106. Act of Mar. 20, 2017, ch. 638, 2017 Va. Acts_, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-1314 (Repl. Vol. 2017)). While the amendment might be read to prohibit com-
missioners from charging any fee for reviewing those documents, the authors understand
that its purpose was to remove the seventy-five-dollar statutory fee cap so that the fee for
that service could be increased as part of a general fee increase approved earlier this year.
Compare JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VA., UNIFORM FEE SCHEDULE GUIDELINES FOR
COMMISSIONERS OF ACCOuNTS 2 (2017), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/circuit/res
ources/coa-feeschedule.pdf_ (last visited Sept. 27, 2017), with JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VA.,
UNIFORM FEE SCHEDULE GUIDELINES FOR COMMISSIONERS OF ACCOUNTS 2 (2016), http:
//www.fredericksburgva.gov/DocumentCenter/View/7181 (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
107. Act of Mar. 3, 2017, ch. 289, 2017 Va. Acts _, (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-
258.3:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2017)); Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 90, 2017 Va. Acts , (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-258.3:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
108. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-258.3:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2017), with id. § 17.1-
258.3:1(A) (Supp. 2016).
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L. Electronic Filing of Fiduciary Returns
Effective January 1, 2018, all estates and trusts must file esti-
mated tax payments, annual income tax returns, and final pay-
ments using an electronic medium in a format to be prescribed by
the Tax Commissioner. 109
M. Adult Exploitation
Two new 2017 laws provide greater protection for individuals
who may be susceptible to financial exploitation. The first expands
the definition of "adult exploitation" that must, or may, be reported
to the local department of social services or the adult protective
services hotline under Virginia Code section 63.2-1606.110 Before
the change, only suspected "illegal use of an [older or incapaci-
tated] adult or his resources" was required to be reported."' The
revised definition now also includes any activities that are "unau-
thorized, improper or fraudulent" or that deprive the adult of right-
ful use or access, and applies to any "funds, property, benefits, re-
sources or other assets," not just the adult's "resources." 1 12
The expanded definition now expressly applies to acts by anyone
involved with adults or their assets, including a caregiver or fidu-
ciary. 113 An action is to be reported if it results in another's "profit,
benefit, or advantage," or deprives the adult of rightful use of or
access to the assets. 114 Examples include: (i) intentionally breach-
ing a fiduciary obligation to the adult's detriment; (ii) neglect of
the adult resulting from failure to use available financial re-
sources; (iii) using undue influence, coercion, or duress to acquire,
possess or control the adult's financial resources or property; and
(iv) forcing or coercing an adult to pay for goods or services or per-
form services for another's profit, benefit, or advantage if the adult
109. Act of Apr. 28, 2017, ch. 836, item 275(K)(1)(e), 2017 Va. Acts _.
110. Act of Feb. 23, 2017, ch. 195, 2017 Va. Acts, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-100 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (definition of "adult exploitation"); see
id. § 63.2-1603 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (definitions of "adult" and "incapacitated person").
112. Id. § 63.2-100 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
113. Id.
114. Id. §§ 63.2-100, -1606(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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did not agree, or was tricked, misled, or defrauded into agreeing to
do so. 115
The second legislative change amends Virginia Code section
63.2-1605 to expand the reporting requirements for suspected in-
stances of financial exploitation of an older or incapacitated
adult.116 The amendment requires financial exploitation involving
any amount to be reported to local law enforcement agencies.117
Previously, reporting was required only if the amount exceeded
$50,000.118
N. Assistance with Advance Medical Directives
Advance medical directives are legal documents, but Virginia
lawmakers have tried to encourage their use by making a sample
form available to the public. 119 A 2017 amendment confirms that
non-lawyers who distribute qualifying forms and certain others
who assist the public with their completion no longer need to worry
about being charged with the unauthorized practice of law.120
Agents and employees of health care providers and "qualified
advance directive facilitators" do not engage in the unauthorized
practice of law when they distribute advance medical directive
forms or provide technical advice, consultation, and assistance in
completing and executing them.1 21 A person may become a quali-
fied advance directive facilitator by completing a training program
115. Id. § 63.2-100 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
116. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 473, 2017 Va. Acts-, -(codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1605(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017)); Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 459, 2017 Va. Acts _,
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1605(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1605(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
118. Compare id. § 63.2-1605(C), (H), (I) (Repl. Vol. 2017), with id. § 63.2-1605(C), (H),
(I) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
119. See id. § 54.1-2984 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
120. Act of Mar. 24, 2017, ch. 752, 2017 Va. Acts_, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2017); id. §§ 54.1-2988.1, -2993.1 (Cum.
Supp. 2017)); Act of Mar. 24, 2017, ch. 747, 2017 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2017); id. §§ 54.1-2988.1, -2993.1
(Cum. Supp. 2017)).
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2988.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
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approved by the Department of Health and passing a written ex-
amination. 122 In order to qualify, the training program must in-
clude instruction on the meaning of provisions of a directive and
requirements for demonstrating competence in helping persons
complete and execute the form. 123
Non-lawyers who do not satisfy the requirements to give tech-
nical advice and consultation may still provide ministerial assis-
tance in completing or executing the form, such as reading it to a
person, discussing the person's preferences, recording the person's
answers on the form, and helping obtain necessary signatures. 124
The more limited protection does not apply to expressing an opin-
ion on the legal effects of any item contained in the form or offering
legal advice to theperson.1 25
In a related measure, the General Assembly also amended Vir-
ginia Code sections 32.1-325 and 63.2-501 to require state entities
that receive Medicaid applications to provide those applicants with
information about the purpose and benefits of advance medical di-
rectives and the procedure for making them. 126
0. Reciprocity of Do Not Resuscitate Orders
Virginia Code section 54.1-2987.1 was amended to confirm that
a "Durable Do Not Resuscitate" order or similar document exe-
cuted in another state according to its laws will be given the same
legal effect as one executed in accordance with Virginia law.127
P. Capacity Determinations Under Advance Medical Directives
The incapacity of an individual subject to an advance medical
directive generally is determined by the attending physician, who
122. Id. § 54.1-2982 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Sipp. 2017); id. § 2993.1 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
123. Id. § 54.1-2993.1 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
124. Id. § 54.1-2988.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
125. Id.
126. See Act of Feb. 21, 2017, ch. 106, 2017 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-325(A)(9) (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017); id. § 63.2-501(C) (Repl.
Vol. 2017)).
127. Act of Feb. 23, 2017, ch. 179, 2017 Va. Acts_, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2987.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2017)).
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must certify in writing upon personal examination of the patient
that the patient is incapable of making an informed decision re-
garding health care; that determination is then reviewed and con-
firmed in writing by another physician or clinical psychologist. 1 28
The process must be followed prior to (or as soon as reasonably
practicable after) providing, continuing, withholding, or withdraw-
ing health care, and must be repeated no less frequently than every
180 days while the need for health care continues.129
However, as of July 1, 2017, in the case of the patient's admis-
sion to a facility for mental health treatment, the incapacity deter-
mination may be made not only by the attending physician, but
also by (i) a psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist, (ii) a li-
censed psychiatric nurse practitioner, (iii) a licensed clinical social
worker, or (iv) a designee of the local community services board
who has personally examined the patient.130
Similarly, if the agent is to have the authority to make
healthcare decisions over the declarant's protest, the directive
must explicitly authorize the action; moreover, the declarant's ca-
pacity at the time the advance medical directive is made must be
established contemporaneously in writing by the declarant's at-
tending physician or a licensed clinical psychologist. 131 The 2017
amendment expands the class of professionals who may make that
attestation to include (i) other licensed physicians, (ii) licensed
physician assistants, (iii) licensed nurse practitioners, (iv) licensed
professional counselors, and (v) licensed clinical social workers
who are familiar with the declarant. 132
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
129. Id.
130. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 474, 2017 Va. Acts, (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2983.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2017)); Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 456, 2017 Va. Acts _,__ (codified
at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2017)).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986.2(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
132. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 474, 2017 Va. Acts_, -(codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2986.2(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2017)); Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 456, 2017 Va. Acts
-, (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986.2(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
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Q. Amendment of Death Certificates
Revisions to Virginia Code section 32.1-269.1 clarify the proce-
dures for amending death certificates. 133 The State Registrar may
change a death certificate based on an affidavit if the change re-
lates to the spelling of the name of the decedent, the decedent's
parent or spouse, or the informant; or to the decedent's sex, age,
race, date or place of birth, citizenship, social security number, ed-
ucation, occupation, military status, date or place of death, or place
of residence (if within the Commonwealth).1 34 This is not a change
from prior law.135
However, other corrections, such as changing the decedent's
name, marital status, or place of residence outside Virginia, or the
name of the decedent's parent or spouse or the informant, may be
made only by court order.136 The decedent's surviving spouse or im-
mediate family member, the attending funeral service licensee, or
another reporting source may petition the circuit court where the
decedent resided or the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond for
an order to amend the death certificate. 137 If an applicant believes
that a death certificate should be amended in some other particu-
lar, or if the State Registrar refuses to amend the certificate in re-
sponse to an affidavit, the applicant may similarly petition the
court in Richmond or in the jurisdiction where the applicant re-
sides. 138 The petition must be served on the State Registrar and
any person who provided information for the death certificate un-
less that person has provided an affidavit in support of the peti-
tion.139 Unless the court finds that a hearing is necessary, it may
enter an order without a hearing.140
133. Act of Mar. 3, 2017, ch. 285, 2017 Va. Acts-_, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-269.1 (Cum. Supp. 2017)); Act of Mar. 3, 2017, ch. 284, 2017 Va. Acts ,
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269.1 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
135. Compare id. § 32.1-269.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2017), with id. § 32.1-269.1(D) (Supp.
2016).
136. Id. § 32.1-269.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 32.1-269.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
139. Id. § 32.1-269.1(D), (E) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
140. Id.
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R. Real Estate Taxes of Certain Surviving Spouses
The 2017 General Assembly enacted legislation that authorizes
localities to provide a real estate tax exemption for the primary
residence of the surviving spouse of a law-enforcement officer, fire-
fighter, search-and-rescue personnel, or emergency medical ser-
vices provider who is killed in the line of duty. 141 The individual
must have died on or after April 8, 1972, in the line of duty as a
direct or proximate result of performing his duty. 142 The surviving
spouse remains eligible for the exemption until death or remar-
riage. 143
The property must be the spouse's principal residence, and the
exemption is transferable if the spouse moves from one principal
residence to another.144 Extended periods of residence in a hospital,
nursing home, convalescent home or other facility for physical or
mental care will not affect the spouse's eligibility for the exemption
so long as the property is not used by or leased to others for consid-
eration. 145
The exemption applies to a dwelling and up to one acre of land
on which it is situated, but only to the extent that the assessed
value of the dwelling does not exceed the average assessed value of
homes in that locality on land zoned as single-family residential. 146
It is available whether the spouse owns the property outright, as a
tenant for life, in a revocable trust over which the spouse holds a
power of revocation, or in an irrevocable trust under which the
spouse holds an estate for life or enjoys a continuing right of use or
141. Act of Feb. 24, 2017, ch. 248, 2017 Va. Acts, (codified at VA. CODEANN. §§ 58.1-
3219.13 to -3219.16 (Repl. Vol. 2017)). The exemption is available to the surviving spouse of
a law-enforcement officer; a jail officer; a regional jail or jail farm superintendent; a police
chaplain; a firefighter or emergency medical services provider; a member of the Virginia
National Guard or the Virginia Defense Force; an Alcoholic Beverage Control agent; a con-
servation officer or forest warden; a member or employee of certain state agencies; a munic-
ipal employee providing services in an emergency; a member of a hazmat response team, or
a Motor Vehicles enforcement employee. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-400 (Cum. Supp. 2017);
id. § 58.1-3219.13 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-400 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
143. Id. § 58.1-3219.14(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 58.1-3219.16 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
146. Id. § 58.1-3219.14(B), (D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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support.1 47 If other owners have interests in the property, the ex-
emption is prorated.148
II. CASES
A. Authority of Agent to Change Principal's Estate Plan
In Reineck v. Lemen, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether the language of a durable general power of attorney au-
thorized the named agents to take steps that effectively bypassed
the other beneficiaries of the principal's estate plan and caused the
principal's entire estate to pass to the agents. 149
Originally, a married couple, Frank and Jane, executed recipro-
cal estate plans that left a portion of each spouse's estate to his or
her own relatives and a portion to the other spouse's relatives.150
Frank also executed a durable power of attorney that named Jane
as his agent and his daughter, LaVerne Lemen, as Jane's succes-
sor. 5 1 The power of attorney authorized the agent to "perform in a
fiduciary capacity ... anything of any character which I might
do." 15 2
After Frank developed dementia, Jane amended her own estate
documents to eliminate the share for his family, so that at her
death her entire estate would pass to her relatives only.153 Shortly
after Jane's death (and shortly before Frank's), Lemen used her
power of attorney to name herself and her brother as the sole ben-
eficiaries of Frank's individual retirement account.1 54 She also
transferred Frank's other assets to two new trusts she created that
147. Id. § 58.1-3219.14(E) (Repl. Vol. 2017). The exemption is not available to a spouse
who holds only a leasehold or term-of-years interest. Id.
148. Id. § 58.1-3219.14(F) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
149. 292 Va. 710, 713, 792 S.E.2d 269, 270 (2016).
150. Id. at 713-14, 792 S.E.2d at 271.
151. Id. at 714, 792 S.E.2d at 271.
152. Id. at 714, 792 S.E.2d at 271.
153. Id. at 715, 792 S.E.2d at 272.
154. The facts surrounding the change of account beneficiaries were not discussed in the
court's opinion, but it may be inferred from the court's holding that Lemen made the change.
See id. at 719-20, 792 S.E.2d at 274.
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named herself and her brother as the sole remainder beneficiar-
ies. 155
After Frank's death, one of Jane's relatives (and a beneficiary
under her estate plan), William Reineck, sued Lemen, alleging that
she had breached her fiduciary duties. 156 The trial court dismissed
the suit, holding that Jane's relatives were contingent beneficiaries
of Frank's estate plan and therefore lacked standing to bring the
suit.157 Reineck then secured appointment as curator of Frank's es-
tate and filed a second suit in his fiduciary capacity, alleging
breach of fiduciary duty and asking for imposition of a constructive
trust.15 8 The trial court granted summary judgment to Lemen and
charged Reineck personally with Lemen's attorney's fees from both
suits. 159
On appeal, Reineck argued that Lemen had exceeded her au-
thority under the power of attorney by creating the new trusts and
changing the beneficiary designation to eliminate the provisions
for Jane's relatives.160 Declaring that the power of attorney was
unambiguous and should be strictly construed, the supreme court
noted that the power of attorney gave Lemen broad powers to ben-
efit Frank and his wife and descendants.1 61 The court first rejected
Reineck's argument that Lemen's actions had to benefit everyone
with a potential interest in Frank's original trust, finding instead
that a benefit to any one or more of them was sufficient. 162 It held
that Lemen acted in Frank's best interests because her actions did
not harm him during his lifetime, did not affect his concern for the
welfare of his wife, who had predeceased him, and benefitted his
children, as he had intended. 63 The court mentioned, but appeared
to give no weight to, the inconsistency with Frank's pre-existing
estate plan and instead concluded that the broad powers set forth
155. Id. at 715, 792 S.E.2d at 272.
156. Id. at 716, 792 S.E.2d at 272.
157. Id. at 716, 792 S.E.2d at 272.
158. Id. at 716, 792 S.E.2d at 272.
159. Id. at 716, 721-22, 792 S.E.2d at 272, 274.
160. Id. at 716, 720, 792 S.E.2d at 272, 274.
161. Id. at 716-17, 792 S.E.2d at 272-73.
162. Id. at 717-18, 792 S.E.2d at 273.
163. Id. at 718, 792 S.E.2d at 273.
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in the document authorized Lemen to create and fund the new
trusts. 164
The court employed a similar analysis to conclude that Lemen
had the power to change the beneficiaries of Frank's individual re-
tirement account, noting that the power of attorney authorized
Lemen to exercise "all of the rights, privileges, elections, and op-
tions" that Frank possessed and that he obviously had the power
to change beneficiaries.16 5
In reversing the trial court's award of attorney's fees against
Reineck personally, the supreme court found no statutory or con-
tractual basis for departing from the normal rule that each party
bears its own costs of litigation. 166 Charging fees of the second suit
against Reineck personally was improper because he was not be-
fore the court in his personal capacity but instead only as curator;
additionally, charging fees of the first suit was improper because
that suit had already been concluded. 167
B. Will Drafter's Liability to Intended Beneficiary
Historically, Virginia has required strict privity of contract be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant for legal malpractice cases. 168
However, despite this long-established rule, the Supreme Court of
Virginia found in Thorsen v. Richmond Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals that a beneficiary may sue the drafting at-
164. Id. at 718-19, 792 S.E.2d at 273. The court seemed to find the change to have been
warranted by Jane's departure from the couple's original "parallel" plan when she revised
her own estate plan to exclude Frank's descendants. Id. at 718, 792 S.E.2d at 273.
165. Id. at 718, 720, 792 S.E.2d at 273-74. In reaching its conclusion, the court appears
to have considered the broad grant of the general power to "do [all acts] of any character
which I might do" as sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement in Virginia Code section
64.2-1622(A) that the power to change beneficiaries be expressly granted. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-1622(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017); Reineck, 292 Va. at 720, 792 S.E.2d at 274. The court's
construction of the statutory requirement is contrary to the drafters' comments to the Uni-
form Power of Attorney Act (on which the Virginia statute is based), which provide that "the
purpose of [Virginia Code section 64.2-1622(A)] is to make clear that authority for these acts
may not be inferred from a grant of general authority." See UNIF. POWER OF ATT'Y ACT (2006)
art. 2 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2006), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/power%
20of%2Oattorney/UPOAA-2011_Final%2OAct_2017jan3O.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
166. Reineck, 292 Va. at 721, 792 S.E.2d at 275.
167. Id. at 723-24, 792 S.E.2d at 276.
168. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hart, 279 Va. 617, 624-25, 692 S.E.2d 239, 243 (2010).
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torney for malpractice if he or she shows that the attorney and cli-
ent "clearly and definitely intended" to confer a benefit upon the
beneficiary. 169
In 2003, the testatrix, Alice Dumville, engaged an attorney,
James Thorsen, to draft a will that would leave her entire estate
to the Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
("RSPCA") if her mother did not survive her. 170 The parties had no
written contract, but Thorsen admitted he understood that her
goal was to benefit the RSPCA.171 The will he drafted, however, left
only Dumville's tangible property to the charity; her residuary es-
tate passed to her heirs by intestacy.1 72
The RSPCA sued Thorsen for "breach of contract-professional
negligence," arguing that it was a third-party beneficiary of the
testatrix's contract with him.173 On appeal from the trial court's
ruling in favor of the RSPCA, Thorsen argued that a third-party
beneficiary may recover for breach of contract only under Virginia
Code section 55-22, which refers to beneficiaries under an "instru-
ment" and therefore does not apply to beneficiaries of oral con-
tracts.1 74 The supreme court held, however, that the statute, being
silent as to oral contracts, does not abrogate the common law rule
that anyone for whose benefit a contract is made may sue upon
it.75 The court also declared that while the Statute of Frauds, cod-
ified at Virginia Code section 11-2, requires certain types of con-
tracts to be in writing, it does not generally prohibit third-party
beneficiaries from suing on oral contracts.' 76
The court noted that an action for legal malpractice, "while
sounding in tort, is an action for breach of contract."'77 It distin-
guished previous decisions in which third parties had not been per-
mitted to maintain a malpractice claim against a will drafter by
169. 292 Va. 257, 269, 284, 786 S.E.2d 453, 460, 468 (2016).
170. Id. at 262-63, 786 S.E.2d at 457.
171. Id. at 284, 786 S.E.2d at 468.
172. Id. at 263, 786 S.E.2d at 457.
173. Id. at 263, 786 S.E.2d at 457.
174. Id. at 264-65, 786 S.E.2d at 458.
175. Id. at 265-66, 786 S.E.2d at 458-59.
176. Id. at 266, 786 S.E.2d at 459.
177. Id. at 269, 786 S.E.2d at 460 (quoting Oleyar v. Kerr, 217 Va. 88, 90, 225 S.E.2d
398, 400 (1976)).
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claiming to be beneficiaries of the testator's estate rather than the
contract for legal services or claiming to be assignees of the testa-
tor's contractual claim.178 The court saw no reason to treat the in-
tended beneficiaries of a contract for legal services differently from
the beneficiaries of a contract for other professional services, whom
it previously had allowed to bring a third-party claim.179
The court found that the viability of a third-party claim in this
context did not depend on being able to identify the specific party
to be benefitted when the contract was made. 180 Accordingly, a re-
siduary or contingent beneficiary, such as the RSPCA, could bring
a claim as long as it could show that it was a "clearly and definitely
intended" beneficiary of the will.18 1
In addressing Thorsen's statute of limitations plea in bar, the
court observed that some injury must occur to give rise to a cause
of action and that a testamentary beneficiary cannot sustain any
injury during a testator's lifetime because the testator may change
his will at any time. 182 The three-year statute of limitations on con-
tract claims therefore cannot begin to run as to the third-party ben-
eficiaries of a will until the cause of action accrues, at the testator's
death.183
The court found no error in the trial court's finding that
Dumville intended to benefit the RSPCA and that, by accepting the
engagement, Thorsen agreed to undertake that obligation.184 It
therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the RSPCA,
as a clearly and definitely identified third-party beneficiary of the
contract between Dumville and Thorsen, could maintain a mal-
practice action against Thorsen.185
178. See id. at 269-72, 786 S.E.2d at 460-62 (discussing Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va.
361, 384 S.E.2d 593 (1989); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 246 Va. 317, 435 S.E.2d 628 (1993);
Johnson v. Hart, 279 Va. 617, 692 S.E.2d 239 (2010)).
179. Id. at 271, 786 S.E.2d at 461-62 (discussing Ward, 246 Va. 317, 435 S.E.2d 628).
180. Id. at 276, 786 S.E.2d at 464.
181. Id. at 275-76, 786 S.E.2d at 463-64.
182. Id. at 278, 786 S.E.2d at 465.
183. Id. at 278, 786 S.E.2d at 465.
184. Id. at 282, 284, 786 S.E.2d at 467-68.
185. Id. at 284, 786 S.E.2d at 468-69.
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A vigorous dissent argued the majority's reasoning had effec-
tively abolished the long-standing requirement of privity of con-
tract in all legal malpractice actions.186 While acknowledging the
need for attorneys to be held accountable, the dissent observed that
the privity rule protects attorneys against the potential for conflict-
ing duties owed to clients and third parties and against potential
liability that is both uncertain in scope and amount and indefinite
in duration. 187 The dissent also speculated that those prospects
might deter attorneys from accepting estate planning work, mak-
ing it more difficult for the public to obtain needed legal services.188
Calling the majority decision a "radical departure from the existing
law," the dissent concluded that such a change should be a policy
decision for the General Assembly, not the court. 189
For a discussion of the Virginia General Assembly's response to
the Thorsen decision, see Part I.B above. 190
C. Suit by Individual Subject to Adult Guardianship
In Lopez-Rosario v. Habib, the court considered whether an
adult with a court-appointed guardian could file a medical mal-
practice suit in her own name. 191 The plaintiffs parents had previ-
ously been appointed as her co-guardians. 1 9 2 However, a medical
malpractice suit was later filed on behalf of the plaintiff in her own
name.193 The trial court sustained the defendant's plea in bar ar-
guing that, because the plaintiff had court-appointed guardians,
she could not file suit under her own name. 19 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that a guardian
may be appointed to attend to all the personal affairs of an inca-
pacitated person or for more limited purposes. 195 Declaring that the
186. Id. at 284-86, 786 S.E.2d at 469 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 286-89, 786 S.E.2d at 470-71.
188. Id. at 288, 786 S.E.2d at 471.
189. Id. at 290-91, 786 S.E.2d at 472.
190. See supra Part I.B.
191. 291 Va. 293, 295, 785 S.E.2d 214, 214 (2016).
192. Id. at 295, 785 S.E.2d at 214.
193. Id. at 296, 785 S.E.2d at 215.
194. Id. at 296, 785 S.E.2d at 215.
195. Id. at 298, 785 S.E.2d at 216.
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language in the circuit court order appointing the guardian is con-
trolling, the supreme court noted that the order in this instance
did not specify any limitations, effectively granting all of the au-
thority that a court may vest in a guardian, including the authority
and obligation to prosecute lawsuits on the ward's behalf.196 Hav-
ing held under a previous version of the guardianship statute that
a ward may not sue in his or her own name, the court affirmed the
lower court judgment granting the plea in bar on the basis that the
plaintiff lacked standing to file the suit.197
D. Imposition of Constructive Trust
The court in Bank of Hampton Roads v. Powell considered
whether a court could impose a constructive trust on one subdivi-
sion lot after a developer breached its contract to convey a different
lot to the plaintiff.198 The plaintiff, Ethel Powell, had sold her prop-
erty to the developer in exchange for cash and a specifically identi-
fied lot within the anticipated subdivision.199 When the developer
conveyed that lot to a third party instead, Powell sued the devel-
oper, the lot purchaser, and others for breach of contract and fraud-
ulent conveyance and asked the court to impose a constructive
trust on the promised lot. 200 After Powell settled with the lot pur-
chaser and released her claim to the original lot, the trial court
imposed a constructive trust in her favor on the only unsold lot
remaining in the subdivision.201
On appeal, the supreme court observed that a constructive trust
is an equitable remedy designed to prevent fraud or injustice. 202 To
benefit from such a trust, however, a claimant's interest must be
"distinctly traced" into the property that is made the subject of the
trust. 2 0 3 Powell's contract was for a particular lot, and since land is
196. Id. at 299, 785 S.E.2d at 216-17.
197. Id. at 297, 299-300, 785 S.E.2d at 215, 217 (citing Cook v. Radford Comm. Hosp.,
260 Va. 443, 451, 536 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2000)).
198. 292 Va. 10, 11, 785 S.E.2d 788, 789 (2016).
199. Id. at 12, 785 S.E.2d at 789.
200. Id. at 12-13, 785 S.E.2d at 789.
201. Id. at 13, 785 S.E.2d at 789.
202. Id. at 15, 785 S.E.2d at 790.
203. Id. at 15, 785 S.E.2d at 791 (citing Crestar Bank v. Williams, 250 Va. 198, 204, 462
S.E.2d 333, 335 (1995)).
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not fungible, the supreme court ruled that the trial court erred in
imposing a constructive trust on a different lot. 204
E. Possibility of Reverter
In Hamm v. Hazelwood, the court examined the enforceability of
a provision in a deed of gift creating a possibility of reverter. 205 Dor-
othy Hamm conveyed a one-half interest in property to her sister
via a deed of gift that declared the property would automatically
revert to Hamm if her sister's son ever acquired any interest in
it.206 When the donee, Hamm's sister, later died intestate, her son
received a share in the property as an heir in violation of the deed
provision, and the estate's administrator sought the court's guid-
ance as to the validity of the possibility-of-reverter provision.207
The circuit court responded by declaring that the possibility-of-re-
verter provision in the deed was void as an impermissible restraint
on alienation. 208
On appeal by Hamm's successors, the supreme court cited two
common law property rules. The first is that the power to convey
property cannot be plenary unless the owner can limit the convey-
ance powers of future owners. 209 The second is that certain re-
straints on conveyance are so broad as to be unreasonable. 210 The
court noted that these rules generally have been applied to find
that a restraint on alienation is void if it applies generally as to
time and person, but not if it is limited in duration and limited as
to the number of persons to whom conveyance is prohibited. 211 The
court found that the restraint in Hamm's deed was of the latter
type, applying only to a single individual (her sister's son) and for
a limited period (his lifetime). 212 It therefore overruled the circuit
204. Id. at 16-17, 785 S.E.2d at 791.
205. 292 Va. 153, 156, 787 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2016).
206. Id. at 156, 787 S.E.2d at 146.
207. See id. at 157, 787 S.E.2d at 146.
208. See id. at 157, 787 S.E.2d at 146.
209. Id. at 157-58, 787 S.E.2d at 147.
210. Id. at 158, 787 S.E.2d at 147.
211. Id. at 159-60, 787 S.E.2d at 147-48.
212. Id. at 162, 787 S.E.2d at 149.
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court and held the possibility-of-reverter provision in Hamm's deed
to be enforceable. 213
F. Ownership of Engagement Ring After Breakup
In McGrath v. Dockendorf, the court considered whether Vir-
ginia's "heart balm" statute, Virginia Code section 8.01-220, au-
thorizes an action in detinue to recover an engagement ring after
the engagement is ended. 214
After a broken engagement, the disappointed suitor, Docken-
dorf, brought an action in detinue to recover the $26,000 diamond
ring he had given his fianc6e, McGrath. 215 She demurred, arguing
that his action was precluded by the "heart balm" statute, which
prohibits civil actions for alienation of affection, breach of promise
to marry, or criminal conversation. 216 The trial court, however,
viewed the ring as a conditional gift and held that the statute pro-
hibited only the three specified types of actions and not a common
law suit to recover the gift. 2 1 7
On appeal, McGrath continued to maintain that the statute con-
trolled, arguing that an action to recover an engagement ring is
equivalent to an action for breach of promise to marry and there-
fore prohibited by the "heart balm" statute.218 The court disagreed,
observing that a detinue action is limited in scope and offers lim-
ited relief-the return of the ring or its value-while the actions
prohibited by the statute involve any number of financial and so-
cial considerations and imprecise measures of damages.219 In sup-
port of its conclusion, the court noted that it had authorized a com-
mon law cause of action to recover a ring or equivalent value
almost three decades before the "heart balm" statute was en-
acted.220 The court observed that the General Assembly was
213. Id. at 164, 787 S.E.2d at 150-51.
214. 292 Va. 834, 836, 793 S.E.2d 336, 337 (2016).
215. Id. at 836, 793 S.E.2d at 337.
216. Id. at 836, 838-39, 793 S.E.2d at 337-38.
217. Id. at 837, 839, 793 S.E.2d at 337-38.
218. Id. at 838-39, 793 S.E.2d at 338.
219. Id. at 840, 793 S.E.2d at 339.
220. Id. at 838, 793 S.E.2d at 338 (citing Pretlow v. Pretlow, 177 Va. 524, 555, 14 S.E.2d
381, 388 (1941)).
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deemed to know of that judicial precedent and could have worded
that statute to unequivocally bar the underlying cause of action if
it had wished.221
G. Undue Influence in Procuring Lifetime Gift
In Gelber v. Glock, the executors of the estate of an elderly cancer
patient, Beverly Gelber, continued her challenge to the validity of
transfers made shortly before her death, alleging undue influence
and fraud by one of her children. 222 Gelber's estate plan had divided
her estate equally among her five children. 223 While hospitalized
with terminal cancer, however, she signed a deed of gift and bill of
sale that conveyed her home and its contents to one daughter,
Meryl Glock. 2 24 Within a month, Gelber disavowed the transfers
both orally and in writing and filed a complaint against Glock seek-
ing rescission of the transfers. 225 Gelber's executors pursued the
claim after her death. 226
The trial court ruled that the bill of sale, which Gelber signed in
her individual capacity, was effective even though it related to
property she had previously transferred to herself, as trustee of a
revocable trust.2 2 7 It also struck the executors' evidence as to all
claims, ruling that Gelber's disavowals could not be considered. 228
On appeal, the supreme court confirmed that the bill of sale was
effective. 229 Gelber had retained the power to revoke prior convey-
ances to her trust by notifying the trustee in writing, and the court
found she had substantially complied with the notice requirement
by executing an instrument conveying the property to Glock. 230
However, the supreme court overturned the lower court's deci-
sion to exclude evidence of Gelber's disavowals of the transfers,
221. Id. at 840-41, 793 S.E.2d at 339.
222. 293 Va. 497, 503, 800 S.E.2d 800, 804 (2017).
223. Id. at 504, 800 S.E.2d at 804.
224. Id. at 504, 800 S.E.2d at 804.
225. Id. at 504, 800 S.E.2d at 804.
226. Id. at 504-05, 800 S.E.2d at 804-05.
227. Id. at 505, 800 S.E.2d at 805.
228. Id. at 505, 800 S.E.2d at 805.
229. Id. at 508-09, 800 S.E.2d at 806-07.
230. Id. at 508, 800 S.E.2d at 806.
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agreeing with the executors that the "Dead Man's statute," Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-397, provided an exception to the hearsay
rule because Gelber was unavailable and the declarations, though
not contemporaneous with the transfers, were "relevant to the
matter in issue."231
The court found that the executors' evidence of Gelber's "great
weakness of mind" and the "grossly inadequate consideration" or
suspicious circumstances surrounding the transfers was sufficient
to establish a presumption of undue influence. 232 It found that evi-
dence of Glock's interactions with her mother could show a confi-
dential relationship that would also raise the presumption of un-
due influence. 233 In addition, a prima facie case of fraud could arise
from evidence that Glock made misrepresentations of material fact
or false promises to Gelber in order to induce her to convey the
home and contents to Glock. 2 34 For these reasons, the court ye-
versed the trial court's exclusion of the executors' evidence and re-
manded the case for a new trial. 2 35
CONCLUSION
The 2017 Session of the Virginia General Assembly reaffirmed
principles of legal malpractice and real estate conveyancing that
had been called into question by recent opinions of the Supreme
Court of Virginia. The General Assembly also enacted new rules
that empower trustees of certain irrevocable trusts to revise trust
terms without approval from a court or trust beneficiaries. It ex-
panded and updated fiduciaries' statutory rights to deal with digi-
tal assets. Practitioners should study these new systems so as to
take advantage of the planning opportunities they may present.
Legislation also gave personal representatives a way to deal
with encumbrances on a decedent's assets, and refined several
other rules relating to estate administration, medical directives,
and financial exploitation of vulnerable adults. It also expanded
available real estate tax exemptions for surviving spouses of law
231. Id. at 512, 800 S.E.2d at 809.
232. Id. at 530, 800 S.E.2d at 818.
233. Id. at 529-30, 800 S.E.2d at 818.
234. Id. at 530-32, 800 S.E.2d at 818-20.
235. Id. at 535-36, 800 S.E.2d at 821-22.
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enforcement officers and first responders. The amendments and
clarifications should prove useful in their specific areas.
In terms of case law, the Reineck decision confirmed that an
agent need not be bound by the principal's existing estate plan
when making changes to asset titles. The Lopez-Rosario decision
highlighted the effects of adult guardianships, and the Powell de-
cision reminded practitioners of the limits of the constructive trust
doctrine. Hamm explored the proper use of reverter clauses in
deeds; Gelber emphasized the facts-and-circumstances nature of
undue influence claims, while suggesting a substantial compliance
test for settlor/trustees of revocable trusts; and McGrath shed new
light on the age-old question "whose ring is it, anyway?"
